A Critical Analysis of Avicenna’s Theory of “Conceptual Unity of Divine Attributes” Based on the Principle of “Conceptual Limitation and Simplicity of the Reality of Divine Attributes

Articles in Press

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

Sayyed moeinoddin Khalifehsoltani

Ali Reza Kohansal

Sayyed mortaza Hosseini Shahrudi

Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.

10.22067/epk.2024.84583.1276

Abstract

Avicenna, the chief philosopher of the Islamic tradition, presents the theory of the “Conceptual Unity of Divine Attributes” in his works. According to this view, if the concepts of each divine attribute are considered independently of the sacred essence of God, they are distinct from one another. However, when these attributes are applied to God, their specific and limited conceptual distinctions are nullified, and they all converge to a single meaning in reference to the reality of the divine essence. Avicenna justifies this theory in light of the philosophical challenge of abstracting multiple attribute-concepts from the absolutely simple reality of God’s essence.
This article analyzes the theory of the Conceptual Unity of Divine Attributes and, based on the principle of the limitation of concepts and the simplicity of the reality of divine attributes, explains the conceptual distinction of divine attributes, the validity of abstracting multiple attribute-concepts from the singular and absolutely simple reality of God, and the difference between conceptual reference and conceptual unity of divine attributes. The conclusion reached is that Avicenna’s theory—especially its interpretations as “considering the concepts of divine attributes themselves to be simple by removing mental aspects,” “seeing the terms of divine attribute concepts as descriptive or functional,” “reforming the concepts based on the flexibility of language,” and “equating the conceptual reference of divine attributes with their conceptual unity in terms of negative and relational aspects, or their reference to the concept of existence”—faces several challenges. These include the confusion between concept and referent, obliteration of the specialized meanings of divine attribute concepts, and equating conceptual reference with conceptual unity. Unless, of course, Avicenna meant something entirely different by the term conceptual unity of divine attributes than the aforementioned interpretations

Keywords

Conceptual Unity of Divine Attributes

Conceptual Distinction of Divine Attributes

Limitation of Divine Attribute Concepts

Simplicity of the Reality of Divine Attributes

Avicenna

Subjects

• Islamic Philosophy and Kalam

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