Neurophysiological analyses of phenomena such as consciousness, self-experience, and moral decision-making, along with theories of the mental model of the self and integrated information theory, have attempted to reduce perceptual phenomena of the self to brain actions.

Accordingly, arguments based on the perception of a single identity that have been presented in philosophy are challenged by some neuroscientific criticisms. The issue of the present article is to critically examine and analyze neurological and empirical criticisms of a type of evidence for the transmateriality of the self and to find their power in criticizing the reasons for the perception of a single identity. The research method has an interdisciplinary approach and has examined data from theories such as mental representation, in comparison with the teachings of transcendental wisdom, and has conducted a comparative and rational analysis. The findings show that there are strong and significant criticisms against the arguments based on the unity of the mind, but a comparative study of the criticisms against the claims of the arguments shows that many empirical criticisms are successful at the level of functional explanations, however, the explanations have problems in moving to the ontological level, although they have done well in negating pure duality. This research emphasizes the use of neuroscience findings to explain the functions of the soul in an integrated framework in philosophical discussions.

کلیدواژه‌ها / English