The central issue of this research is an examination of the two differing views of John R. Searle and Mullā Ṣadrā concerning the soul. Is the one-dimensional materialistic perspective a better option for explaining the soul, or does the comprehensive immaterialist perspective offer a more solid explanation? Searle believes that all conscious states, while preserving their subjective ontology, are caused by the underlying level of the brain (neurons). Furthermore, he considers rational action to be meaningless without a gap [=freed will], yet this gap conflicts with the causal system of neurons. Searle's solution is that the gap occurs over time; the behavior of neurons at the underlying level is insufficient at any given point to determine the brain's subsequent state. Instead, the subsequent state is determined only through conscious decision-making, which is a feature of the higher-level brain system. Here, the postulate of the self merely provides a necessary framework for the gap, rational action, and the resulting responsibility, without the self being an experience or something experienceable. From Mullā Ṣadrā's perspective, the soul is a reality that possesses a body, with the meaning of body differing at each stage of its substantial motion. All conscious experiences of the faculties occur within a unity that he calls the soul; its truth is "presence" and cannot be conceptualized. From this viewpoint, the concept of "I" or the image one has of oneself in the mind is not one's "true self." Mullā Ṣadrā's pivotal point, in contrast to Searle, is transcending concept and drawing attention to the presence of the soul as the comprehensive and true structure of the human being. However, Searle's approach to the gap ultimately fails to eliminate the necessary causality of the neural system; although the individual feels free will at the higher level of the system, in reality, it is not their choice, but rather the causal and necessary breaking of old neural connections and the formation of new ones. By proposing the immateriality of the soul and removing the veil between conscious states and the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā offers a more solid explanation concerning the existential connection of these states, the expansion of semantic relations, and the substantial evolution of the human essence—an explanation that Searle's materialistic insight is incapable of providing.