Philosophers’ View concerning the Quiddity and Function of Practical Intellect

Document Type : علمی پژوهشی

Author

• alireza najafzadeh

10.22067/philosophy.v43i2.4147

Abstract

Philosophers view the advantage of human soul over animal soul in theoretical and practical intellect. However, there is disagreement among them in stating the quiddity of these two intellects. With a deliberation on their words, at least four interpretations can be implied from these two intellects. After reporting the statements and expressing the functions of practical intellect, the article goes on to evaluate and explain the selected theory. The generally accepted view among the later scholars is that there is no more than one intellect in human soul, which understands all the general sciences and rulings. However, since some of these sciences are merely theoretical and dedicated to external and noumenal realities, they are called theoretical intellects. In this interpretation the distinction of the two intellects from one another is nominal and is in their objects of perceptions (mudrakāt). As maintained in the article, despite its
popularity, this interpretation is not of interest to the distinguished philosophers and is facing various problems. But other statements, with slight tolerance, can be referred to a single comprehensive interpretation; i.e. The first and essential act of practical intellect is to infer partial practical rulings from general rulings of theoretical intellect, and since these rulings in the sovereignty of intellect over physical faculties cause the appearance of will in the soul for issuance of voluntary acts and human fabrications, the practical intellect is also called “practical faculty”.
Keywords: theoretical intellect, practical intellect, general rulings, partial opinion, will, voluntary acts.

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