A Comparison between Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s and Ibn Rushd’s Defense of Philosophy (the Issue of the Indivisibility of Necessary Being)

Document Type : علمی پژوهشی

Author

• Iḥsān Fattāḥī Ardakānī

10.22067/philosophy.v41i2.3956

Abstract

Philosophy has always been attacked by the opponents, and the proponents have defended it against the attacks. Among the opponents of philosophy, the names of Ghazālī and Fakhr Rāzī are outstanding; whereas, Ibn Rushd and Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī by writing Tahāfat al-Tahāfut and Sharḥ-i Mushkilāt al-Ishārāt have undertaken to counter the incessant attacks of these
two and respond to their objections. In this article, the defense by Khwāja Naṣīr and Ibn Rushd concerning the issue of the indivisibility of Wājib (the Necessary) are compared only by using the two books of Tahāfat al-Tahāfut and Sharḥ-i Mushkilāt al-ishārāt. However, in order to better clarify these defenses, the objections of Fakhr Rāzī and Ghazālī have also been pointed out. It will be cleared in this article that contrary to Khwāja, Ibn Rushd regards Wājib as having a quiddity but views its quiddity as the very essence of its existence, believing that Wājib is equivocal genus, consequently having a limit proportionate to itself. Meanwhile, the widespread propounding of the Khwāja's defenses among the philosophers after him is considered to be the outcome of the status of his two books, Ishārāt and Tajrīd.
Keywords: Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Khwāja (Naṣīr al-Dīn) Ṭūsī, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), philosophy, defenses, types of combination, the Necessary Being.

---