The Problem Of Objective and Subjective in Nagel’s Philosophy

Document Type : علمی پژوهشی

Author

• Omid Hamedani

Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

10.22067/philosophy.v49i2.68690

Abstract

Thomas Nagel is an outstanding modern philosopher whose writings cut across almost all the important branches of philosophy ranging from the philosophy of mind to political philosophy but the underlying unity of his philosophy stems from the fact that he analyses almost all philosophical issues in the context of the clash between the subjective and the objective perspectives. In his view, this clash leads to a series of philosophical problems that cannot be solved or properly understood without considering the subjective and the objective perspective. In this paper, I have tried to elucidate the way Nagel tackles the problem of the subjective and objective and the meaning of Nagelian objectification on the basis of his The View from Nowhere and The Last Word. I will show how we can distinguish two sorts of objectification in his thought: an objectification based on an objective self that transcends the limited individual perspective and an objectification based on structural features of human thought which sets epistemic limits on how we can think about the world or cast doubt on the foundations of knowledge. I have finally addressed the issue of whether this dual aspect of objectification and Nagel’s claim that we have to shift from one sort of objectification to another as we enter different areas of cognition is logically and philosophically coherent.

Keywords

• objective
• subjective
• Nagel’s objectivism
• perspective
• objective self

---

References

Boghossian, Paul A, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (2006).

Dancy, J. “Contemplating One’s Nagel.” Philosophical Books 29(1): 1-16. (1988)

Dummett, M., Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, (1978).

Frege, G. (1892). “On Sense and Nominatum,” in A. P. Martinich (ed.) The Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press, (1996).

Heidegger, M, Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe, Band. 2. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, (1977).

Husserl, E. The Shorter Logical Investigations, Trans. J. N. Findlay, Edited and Abridged by Dermot Moran. London & New York: Routledge, (2001).

Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1933.

Kierkegaard, S, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Trans. & Ed. Alstair Hannay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2009)

Lycan, W. G., Consciousness, Cambridge: MIT Press, (1987).

Nagel, T, The Last Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1997).

Nagel, T, Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1979).

Nagel, T, The View From Nowhere, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1986).

Peacocke, C., “No Resting Place: A Critical Notice of Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere.” Philosophical Review 98(1): 65-82, (1989).

Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1981).

Quine, W., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, (1969).

Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, (1979).

Thomas, A., Thomas Nagel, Stocksfield: Acumen, (2009).

Williams, B., Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry, London & New York: Routledge, (2005).

Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Trans. D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, (1961).