Comparison of Skeptical Interpretation with Naturalistic Interpretation of the Philosophy of Hume

Document Type : علمی پژوهشی

Authors

• Hāshim Murvārīd
• ‘Alī Ḥaqqī

10.22067/philosophy.v41i1.3181

Abstract

Was Hume really a skeptic empiricist? The common picture that existed about Hume sometime ago outlined him as an empiricist who, contrary to his preceding empiricists, could deduce skepticism which was a corollary of empiricism from it. According to this interpretation, Hume's entire project is negation and rejection of metaphysical knowledge as well as a science based on
principles of empiricism. However, in the first half of twentieth century, David Camp Smith presented a more positive interpretation of Hume. According to his interpretation, Hume's objective is not entirely negating and rejecting; rather, his prime purpose is to indicate that man's fundamental beliefs, which according to the principles of empiricism are not adoptable from experience or intellect, are originated from human nature, and, somehow, the nature imposes them on us. This analysis by Smith transforms Hume from a skeptic empiricist into a naturalist philosopher. The present paper seeks to make a brief comparison between these two interpretations on Hume.
Keywords: philosophy of Hume, empiricism, skepticism, naturalism, fundamental beliefs.

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